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U.S. COMMITTEE 
FOR REFUGEES 
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Suite 701 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
Tel: (202) 347-3507 Fax: (202) 347-3418 
THE RWANDA CRISIS: 
ADVOCACY ACTION ALERT #2 
June 27, 1994 
France's military intervention in Rwanda on June 23 will dramatically change the military, 
political, and humanitarian dynamics inside Rwanda. France has long played a counterproductive 
role in Rwandan political and military affairs--so much so that many view France as an accessory 
to the horrific events that have occurred in Rwanda. 
Militarily, the French intervention could lead to direct fighting between French troops and the 
forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Politically, the intervention will bolster the self-
proclaimed government, whose members are strongly implicated in the past 12 weeks of 
genocide. In humanitarian terms, the bulk of people targeted for elimination are already dead. 
However, the French military deployment could save the lives of thousands of trapped civilians in 
southwest Rwanda, or could, conversely, trigger their quick death at the hands of extremist militia 
who might view the French intervention as providing de-facto protection from their RPF enemies 
and the outside world. 
Even if France's military intervention is actually confined to strictly humanitarian actions, it 
threatens to complicate an already catastrophic emergency. That is why only 10 of 15 members on 
the UN Security Council voted in favor of French intervention--one vote more than the minimum 
required for UN authorization. One of the 10 "yes" votes was cast by Rwanda's illegitimate ruling 
regime, which, incredibly, has been allowed to retain its seat on the Security Council despite the 
genocide it has overseen. 
This memo presents a range of policies which the United States and other governments should be 
encouraged to pursue. 
These recommendations by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) are based on the following 
perspectives: 
• USCR has made five site visits to Rwanda in the past 12 weeks, including a site visit during 
June 19-22. We have monitored Rwanda closely for more than a decade. 
• Although the French military intervention is now a fait accompli, we believe that France's 
intervention should be of very limited scope and duration. France should not deploy in Kigali--that 
would almost certainly dramatically worsen the situation by precipitating armed conflict between 
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the RPF and the French. Multilateral UN troops should replace French troops as soon as possible, 
and certainly within the two-month deadline set by the UN Security Council. 
• The United States has been shamefully passive in its failure to take action to halt genocide in 
Rwanda. The lack of interest demonstrated by the United States government and by other 
impartial countries has provided an opportunity for a partisan government--France--to re-enter 
Rwanda even though its presence in Rwanda was specifically precluded by the Rwandan peace 
treaty known as the Arusha accord, signed on August 4, 1993. 
• We believe that po~icies of the U.S., France, and the UN should address five main needs: 
A - Stop the Genocide 
B- Limit France's Role 
C - Declare the Ruling Regime lllegitimate 
D - Impose Accountability for Massacres 
E - Improve Humanitarian Relief Inside Rwanda 
A. Stop the Genocide 
Policy Strategy Most killings are done by civilian militias associated with the Rwandan army and 
the ruling MRND party. The great bulk of the hundreds of thousands of civilians killed were 
killed by the end of April. However, modest numbers of troops deployed in strategic locations in 
southwest Rwanda could still effectively protect significant numbers of Rwandan civilians. For 
example, the 400 UN troops currently in Kigali are credited with protecting the lives of some 
15,000 civilians who otherwise would probably have been massacred. As few as 10 UN troops 
effectively protected some 600 Tutsis at a single hotel in Kigali for two months. 
1-A • U.S. Should Declare That Genocide Is Occurring in Rwanda 
The U.S. government should acknowledge reality and declare that the massacres in 
Rwanda constitute genocide as defined under international law known as the Genocide Convention 
of 1948. The U.S. should fulftll its legal obligation to stop genocide--an obligation the U.S. has 
thus far shirked. 
The failure of the United States to confront the genocide constitutes a massive moral failure 
by the Clinton Administration and an historically shameful abdication of moral leadership by. the 
United States. 
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2-A • Station French Troops At Precise Locations in Rwanda's Southwest: Where Tutsi 
Survivors Are Known to be Trapped 
French troops should not disperse throughout the entirety of Rwanda. They should 
especially not enter Kigali. They should deploy only at sites behind "government" lines, where 
targeted people at risk are located. Killings continue primarily in the southwestern quadrant of the 
country under the control of the ruling regime and militia gangs. Efforts to halt the massacres 
should focus on this one-quarter of the country. Rescue troops can make most efficient use of 
their limited numbers by deploying at strategic locations where at-risk populations have 
congregated and can still be saved. Examples of specific locations (prone to change day-to-day): 
* Kansi (55 miles south of Kigali, 10 miles south of Butare)--an estimated 20,000 persons 
have reportedly sought refuge on church grounds. 
* Nyarushishi (85 miles southwest of Kigali, 3 miles east of Cyangugu)--some 8,000 
persons have been detained by militia at a former refugee camp; an undetermined number are 
reportedly at a Catholic bishopric. 
* Mibirizi (85 miles southwest of Kigali, 15 miles southeast of Cyangugu)--1,700 
reportedly in refuge and at risk on the grounds of a Catholic mission. 
* Butare (50 miles southwest of Kigali)--reportedly a population of 100 to several 
thousand persons has taken refuge at a Catholic seminary and an Episcopal center in Butare, where 
they and others remain in danger. 
* Kibuye (50 miles west of Kigali, on shore of Lake Kivu)--at-risk populations are trapped 
at the convent of St. Mary of Namur and have appealed for evacuation assistance. 
* Nyamasheke (70 miles west of Kigali, 15 miles northeast of Cyangugu)-·-undetermined 
numbers of persons reportedly have congregated. 
3-A • Station French Troops Along Main Refugee Escape Routes in Areas Controlled by 
Ruling Regime 
Militias and government troops have blocked key roads, preventing Tutsi and civilians 
generally from fleeing to refugee camps outside the country. French troops should secure those 
main corridors so that civilians can escape danger. 
4-A • Station Non-French UN Observer Troops in RPF Territory 
Most of RPF-controlled territory is relatively calm. The war and massacres generally 
ended when government troops and militias retreated. UN observer troops in RPF territory can 
monitor the situation and build the confidence of relief organizations attempting to establish 
programs in those regions. Any UN troops sent into RPF territory, however, should not be 
French, nor should they be under French command. 
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5-A • Mandate All French and UN Troops to Detain Massacre Leaders 
In many locations, the militia leaders are widely known and readily identifiable. They 
should be detained immediately when found. Failure of French troops to do this would 
demonstrate their motives are not to stop the massacres and would in fact encourage more 
massacres. Many militia leaders are escaping and pose a security risk in refugee camps in asylum 
countries. In Benaco refugee camp in Tanzania, for example, a prominent militia leader whom 
authorities failed to detain recently provoked a riot among his followers, forcing the evacuation of 
most relief workers. The UN Security Council should modify the mandate of the French forces to 
detain massacre leaders. 
6-A • Jam Extremist Radio Broadcasts That Incite Massacres 
Radio transmissions controlled by supporters of the ruling regime have continued to incite 
violence and hatred in Rwanda. Broadcasts since the French intervention have reportedly cited 
French "support" as a reason to continue fighting. U.S. military personnel say they possess the I 
technical ability to "jam" these broadcasts but have not been instructed to do so by U.S. officials. ---. 
Reports in the past couple days indicate that a new radio station owned by Hutu extremists 
is broadcasting into Burundi from Rwanda or Zaire and is seeking to inflame ethnic tensions 
inside Burundi. U.S. and UN officials should take action to shut down this station as well, before 
events erupt in Burundi. 
7-A • Grant Temporary Protected Status to Burundi Citizens in the U.S. 
Events in Rwanda continue to exacerbate the instability in neighboring Burundi, where 
some 50,000 persons died in politically instigated ethnic violence late last year. Killings have 
continued in Burundi, and strong potential exists for an explosion of massive violence there, 
especially if the French presence in Rwanda leads to conflict with the RPF. 
Burundian citizens who are currently in the United States--believed to number fewer than· 
500--should not be forced to return to Burundi when their U.S. visas expire. Federal law 
empowers the U.S. Attorney General to grant temporary safe haven to foreign nationals in the 
U.S. when armed conflict in their home country would "pose a serious threat" to their return 
home. Temporary Protected Status is usually granted for a period of one year. 
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B. Limit France's Role 
Policy Strategy At least nine countries (other than France) have offered a combined total of 
4,500 troops for a UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. This multinational force would be 
preferable to the French military intervention. The UN authorized France's intervention as an 
interim measure until an expanded multinational UN force can arrive. The U.S. should work to 
ensure that the French presence is as short as possible by facilitating rapid deployment of a 
multinational UN force. No forces from contiguous countries should be included in a UN 
mission. 
8-B • U.S. Should Insist That France's Intervention Adhere Strictly to the Mandate and 
Time Limit Imposed by the UN 
The UN Security Council resolution authorizing French intervention in R 'wanda stressed 
that the intervention must be "impartial and neutral," that French troops must not intervene in 
fighting between the RPF and Rwanda's military, and that France's intervention be:~ "limited to a 
period of two months" or less. U.S. officials should make clear to France and the UN that these 
guidelines must be honored to the letter. An adequate force of multinational UN troops should 
replace French forces as soon as possible, and certainly in less than two months. 
9-B • U.S. Should Speed Deployment of Multinational UN Troops to Rwanda 
Financial and logistical constraints are delaying the deployment of some 4,500 
multinational UN troops. State Department officials announced more than a month ago that the 
U.S. might provide extensive financial and logistical support to UN peacekeeping efforts in 
Rwanda, but so far the U.S. has pledged only 50 armored personnel carriers, most of which have 
not arrived in Rwanda. 
U.S. officials should speed the deployment of a truly multinational force in Rwanda by 
announcing immediately that the U.S. stands ready to provide greater financial, lo~~stical, and 
equipment support to a multinational UN effort. The U.S. should then actually deliver on that 
commitment. 
10-B • Specifically Mandate That French Forces Arrest Any Suspected Mass Murderers 
They Encounter 
One sure way to contribute to stopping the massacres is to arrest and detain those who 
have perpetrated the massacres. This will deter additional killing of innocent civilians and will also 
contribute to efforts to affiX accountability. 
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C. Declare the Ruling Regime Illegitimate 
Policy Strategy Officials who proclaimed themselves the government of Rwanda after the April 
6 assassination of the president should have no governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the world. 
The regime is composed of individuals who are implicated in genocide, and recognition of them as 
"government officials" is inconsistent with the principles of the Arusha accord The RPF should 
restate its commitment to the principles of the Arusha accord. 
11-C • Remove the Rwanda Regime's UN Credentials. Remove Rwanda from the UN 
Security Council. Block Rwanda from Chairing the Security Council. 
Rwanda currently has no clearly constitutional "peace loving" government, as required by 
the UN charter. The current regime should not be allowed to "represent" Rwanda at the UN since 
it has not met UN membership criteria. Incredibly, a regime which is guilty of successful 
genocide has been allowed to flll Rwanda's seat on the UN Security Council and has been allowed 
to participate in setting UN policy toward that genocide. 
Until a legitimate government exists in Rwanda, Rwanda's seat at the UN should be 
declared vacant and Rwanda should be removed from the Security Council. Any Rwandan 
government should be barred from chairing the UN Security Council in September, as Rwanda is 
currently scheduled to do. 
12-C • Send U.S. Ambassador on Tour of Safe Areas of Rwanda 
Although the U.S. Ambassador evacuated in April, he remains U.S. Ambassador to 
Rwanda. In that capacity, Ambassador Rawson can and should now travel to those areas of the 
country that are relatively calm and secure, including territory controlled by the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front. The trip would indicate that the U.S. will not allow questions of sovereignty to impede the 
U.S. from conducting its diplomatic and other constructive business with the people of Rwanda, 
for which the Ambassador is responsible. 
13-C • Freeze Rwandan Government Assets 
The current ruling regime should not be allowed to strip Rwanda's assets for the regime's 
illegitimate activities. A regime composed of individuals who have perpetrated genocide--the 
ultimate crime against humanity--should be barred from exploiting the country's remaining assets. 
14-C • The RPF Should Publicly Restate Its Commitment to Multi-Ethnic, Multi-Party 
Government and the Principles of the Arusha Accord 
The RPF should make clear that it does not intend to impose a strictly RPF government 
nor a strictly Tutsi government on Rwanda. The RPF should emphasize that it remains committed 
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to the principles of the Arusha accord, which call for a broad-based government and a pluralistic 
society. RPF pronouncements in support of the Arusha principles could strengthen Hutu 
moderates in Rwanda and moderates of both ethnic groups in neighboring Burundi. 
D. Impose Accountability for Massacres 
Policy Strategy The international community should accelerate efforts to document the 
massacres and identify the main planners and leaders of the killings in order to bring them to 
justice. Failure to impose accountability in a public manner will allow many culpable military, 
political, and militia leaders to escape and will send a dangerous signal worldwide--particularly to 
Burundi, where the potential for organized violence remains high. Thorough documentation of the 
atrocities in Rwanda is required to begin the difficult process of healing Rwandan society and to 
educate the world that genocide has in fact occurred while the world watched. Every day, more 
evidence disappears. 
15-D • Fund Major Investigation and Documentation of Rwanda's Genocide 
A relatively small, limited investigation into Rwanda's massacres is underway under the 
auspices of the UN Human Rights Commission. The U.S. should provide diplomatic, financial, 
and logistical support for a full and immediate investigation to document the roots of genocide. 
That effort should not be confmed to UN entities alone--it should specifically ~elude independent 
nongovernmental institutions. 
16-D • Arrest Known Militia Leaders Who Are Outside Rwanda in Refugee Camps or 
Traveling Internationally 
The world community should not allow mass murderers to walk away frorn their deeds. 
These individuals should be arrested on sight worldwide and detained until an international or 
Rwandan tribunal is prepared to prosecute them. 
Rwandan refugees in Tanzania have readily identified militia leaders and others living in 
their midst who coordinated and led the massacres of Tutsi and government opponents. Some 
Rwandans implicated in the massacres are reportedly traveling internationally with diplomatic 
passports. The U.S. and other countries should deny entry to those individuals and detain them. 
This mandate should be placed on all governments into whose jurisdictions Rwanda's mass 
murderers may enter. 
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E. Improve Humanitarian Relief In Rwanda 
Policy Strategy The international community has mounted a determined effort to assist 400,000 
Rwandan refugees in neighboring countries, but relief efforts inside Rwanda remain paltry for an 
estimated 2 million or more persons who have been uprooted or seriously injured by the violence. 
The war and ongoing massacres are now concentrated in the southwest quadrant of Rwanda, while 
much of the rest of the country is now quiet, accessible, and in dire need of relief assistance in the 
aftermath of the devastating massacres. 
The RPF has invited NGOs to assist what it says are 1.9 million persons in its territory. 
However, many NGOs, as well as the U.S. government, have been slow to respond. This is due, 
in part, to concerns that working in RPF-controlled territory would be too "political," although 
working in areas controlled by the "government" is potentially even more so. The humanitarian 
needs in Rwanda are immense. Food and medical care are in short supply. Humanitarian 
assistance should not be held hostage to diplomatic questions about territorial sovereignty. 
17 -E • Specifically Increase Assistance to the Few NGOs Now On-Site 
As recently as last week, USCR witnessed the International Committee of the Red Cross 
and Medecins Sans Frontieres operating in numerous locations throughout Rwanda's RPF sector. 
The medical and non-food needs they are confronting are staggering: the food situation is 
deteriorating. Targeting resources to organizations already on-site can expedite deployment of 
those resources. 
18-E • Expand the Mix of Humanitarian Organizations On-Site 
The U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is an excellent ann of the U.S. 
government and is capably staffed. During the Rwanda crisis, OFDA has g~ff~~~.f~Q!ll.S~te 
Departme_n_t.R_olitical restrictions which hamper a~lau11c~ergetic humanitarian 
--response in Rwanda. -
OFDA urgently needs to launch a comprehensive response inside Rwanda by reaching out 
to NGOs that could meet particular needs there, rather than waiting for NGOs to assess, negotiate, 
and "gear up" programs in Rwanda on their own. 
19-E • Provide Technical Assistance to Smooth the Implementation of Humanitarian 
Efforts Inside Rwanda 
The RPF controls more than half of Rwanda. In that area, the RPF reports that nearly 2 
million civilians have been affected by the war, yet the RPF lacks a well-established, experienced 
humanitarian/civil affairs capacity. Prior to April 1994, the RPF anticipated that a transitional 
government provided for in the Arusha accrord would be implemented in a timely fashion, and that 
the appropriate arms of that government wbuld meet civilian needs. Obviously that assumption 
was invalidated by the genocide and ensuing war. As the controlling power in most of Rwanda, 
the RPF could benefit from politically neutral technical assistance in overseeing and responding to 
the overwhelming number of humanitarian initiatives they will now be required to deal with. 
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